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Abstract 
Research in information systems includes a range of approaches that make varied contributions in 
terms of knowledge, understanding, and practical developments. In these days of “fake news” and 
spurious Internet content, scholarly research needs to be able to demonstrate its validity: Are its 
findings true and its recommendations correct? We argue that there are fundamental validation 
criteria that can be applied to all research approaches despite their apparent diversity and conflict. 
These stem from current views on the nature of truth and the related but wider concept of correctness 
within philosophy. There has been much debate about the nature of truth: Is it correspondence, 
coherence, consensual, or pragmatic? Current debates revolve around the idea of a pluralist view of 
truth—that there are different forms of truth depending on the context or domain. Related to truth is 
the wider concept of correctness: propositions may be true, but correctness can also be applied to 
actions, performances, or behavior for which truth is not appropriate. We develop a framework for 
research validity and apply it to a range of research forms including positivist, interpretive, design 
science, critical, and action oriented. The benefits are: (1) a greater and more explicit focus on 
validity criteria will produce better research; (2) having a single framework can provide some 
commonality between what, at times, seem like conflicting approaches to research; (3) having criteria 
made explicit should encourage debate and further development. The framework is applied to a 
variety of empirical papers employing varied research approaches. 
Keywords: Action Research, Correctness, Critical Research, Design Science, Interpretive Research, 
Positivist Research, Simulation, Truth, Validation. 
Alan Lee was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on August 3, 2016, and underwent two 
revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Information systems (IS) is a wide-ranging discipline 
involving varied forms of research, each with different 
purposes. There is research aimed at producing 
knowledge, from a variety of perspectives—positivist 
(Dubé & Paré, 2003; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 
2004), interpretive (Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 
2006), critical (Klein & Huynh, 2004; Mingers, 2004b) 
and more; research that aims at producing software or 
IT/IS artifacts—design science (Hevner et al., 2004); 
and research that hopes to bring about improvements 
to organizational problems—action research 
(Chiasson, Germonprez, & Mathiassen, 2009). These 
heterogeneous forms of research are carried out in 
many different ways, based on different and sometimes 
conflicting assumptions, and often use fundamental 
concepts such as “information,” “theory,” “causality,” 
or “knowledge” incompatibly.  
We are not against the idea of pluralism in IS research 
at all (Mingers, 2001a, 2003), but we do agree with Lee 
(Lee, 1991; Lee & Hubona, 2009; Lee, Briggs, & 
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Dennis, 2014; Lee & Hovorka, 2015) that there needs 
to be some degree of coherence or rigor underlying 
these multifarious approaches in order to justify and 
validate the results that end up being published in our 
journals and used as a basis for affecting people’s lives. 
This will be discussed further in Section 1.2. 
In this paper, we will investigate one, crucial, element 
of research—that of truth or correctness—which, in 
many ways, underlies all the others. Scholarly research 
in any field aims to produce knowledge, not least 
within IS, where we also have the specific domain of 
knowledge management, which appears to have 
knowledge as its subject matter (Mingers, 2008). This 
immediately begs the question of what, exactly, 
knowledge is, and how it differs from mere belief or 
opinion. Traditionally, within philosophy, knowledge 
is said to be “justified true belief” (Gettier, 1963; 
Pritchard, 2006); that is, it is a kind of belief or opinion 
about how the world is but one for which we have 
evidence or warrant, and, essentially, that is actually 
true, whether or not we can in fact determine its truth. 
This leads to the further question of what exactly truth 
is, for unless we know what truth is, we cannot 
understand what knowledge is.1 
1.1 Truth and Correctness 
That truth is indeed a goal of IS research has been 
expressed, for example, by Straub et al. (2004, p. 383): 
“The purpose of validation is to give researchers, their 
peers, and society as a whole a high degree of 
confidence that positivist methods being selected are 
useful in the quest for scientific truth.” However, in 
most published papers, including Straub et al.’s, the 
actual nature of truth and how it might be discovered 
is little discussed. This provides the starting point of 
this paper: What is the nature of truth?2 
There is a traditional view within philosophy—the 
correspondence theory of truth (Lynch, 2001)—
perhaps best expressed by Aristotle: “To say that that 
which is, is, and that that which is not, is not, is true.” 
That is, there is a relationship of correspondence 
between beliefs or statements about the world and the 
way the world actually is. But, to clearly articulate a 
theory of truth, we need to specify its elements: What 
can have this truth property (known as the “truth 
bearer”)? What could make the truth bearer true 
(known as the “truth maker”)? Finally, what is the 
nature of the correspondence relationship? 
There have, however, been many criticisms of the 
correspondence view of truth, particularly in terms of 
its realist view of the external world, and these 
criticisms have motivated a number of alternatives. For 
example, coherence theory, which evaluates a belief in 
 
1 We recognize the inevitable circularity here—knowledge 
requires truth, but truth requires knowledge (of truth). 
terms of its coherence or consistency with other well-
attested beliefs (Walker, 1989); pragmatism, which 
focusses on long-term success in practice (James, 
1976; Peirce, 1878); and consensus theory (Habermas, 
1978), which sees truth as that which a relevant 
community of inquirers agrees upon. A more radical 
approach known as deflationism (Quine, 1992; 
Strawson, 1950) suggests that truth actually has no 
substantive nature to be explained, and that it is really 
just a linguistic pseudo-problem.  
More recently, in the face of the seeming standoff 
between these competing positions, a new approach 
has been developing within philosophy that aims to 
retain the idea that truth is a substantive concept that 
retains some form of realism about the relationship of 
truth to the external world, while accepting the 
criticisms of standard correspondence theory. This 
approach involves a pluralist view of truth: “truth is 
one and truth is many” (Lynch, 2009)—i.e., there are 
generic characteristics of truth, but these may be 
realized differently in different domains (Lynch, 1998; 
Pedersen & Wright, 2013c). For example, in the 
physical domain, one might hold a correspondence 
view, while in the mathematical domain, one might 
have a coherence view. These different views of truth 
are discussed more fully in Appendix A. 
Although truth may be a defining characteristic of 
knowledge, as discussed above, not all IS research 
concerns purely knowledge. Design science, for 
example, aims to produce effective software or 
artifacts, and action research aims to solve problems in 
organizations. In these domains, it may actually be 
appropriate not to talk about truth, but rather the related 
term correctness (Engel, 2013; Thomson, 2008). It 
seems more satisfactory to say that a computer system 
works “correctly” rather than “truly.” In many areas, 
truth and correctness seem equivalent: If a belief is true 
then it will also be correct; similarly, a belief that is 
incorrect would thereby be false. But, correctness is a 
wider term than truth in that it applies to things other 
than beliefs or propositions, for example actions or 
procedures.  
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop a 
general framework, based on the concepts of pluralistic 
truth and correctness, which can be applied across all 
areas of research in IS. Essentially, this will specify 
criteria for evaluating the rigor and validity of the 
research whatever its particular philosophy or method. 
This is akin to Lee and Hubona’s (2009) proposal that 
the fundamental logical laws of modus ponens and 
modus tollens can be applied across many research 
methods to produce more rigorous research. 
2 For good introductions to modern discussions of truth see 
Lynch (2001), Engel (2002) or Kunne (2003). 
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In the first section of the paper, we explain the pluralist 
view of truth. Specific theories of truth and details 
about the pluralist view are outlined in Appendix A. In 
the next section, we link truth to correctness and 
produce an overall framework of truth and correctness 
and their links to research validity. Then, in the third 
section of the paper, we apply the framework to a 
variety of research approaches—positivist statistical 
analysis, mathematical modeling and simulation, 
interpretive research, critical research, and, finally, 
action research. In the final section, we discuss the 
benefits of this framework. 
A number of concerns or issues have been raised about 
our general approach and we wish to deal with them 
specifically; however, in order to avoid disturbing the 
logic of our argument, we have collected these together 
in Appendix B. 
2 Philosophical Development of 
Theories of Truth 
The issue of truth revolves around two questions: Does 
truth have a nature that can be analyzed? And, if so, 
what is that nature? The first question has provoked 
major debates between substantialist or robust theories 
of truth, such as correspondence, coherence, consensus 
or pragmatic theories, which claim that there is an 
analyzable nature, and skeptical theories, such as 
deflationist theories, which claim that there actually is 
not an underlying nature to truth, or that there can be 
no possible access to a corroborating external world. 
The major question for substantialist theories is that of 
realism in the sense of an accessible external world to 
which beliefs can correspond. The various theories of 
truth and their problems are explained in Appendix A. 
The situation within the substantialist camp had been 
something of a stalemate with strong and valid 
criticisms of correspondence theory but no satisfactory 
alternative (Pedersen & Wright, 2013a). This led to the 
development of pluralist theories of truth. 
2.1 Pluralist Theories 
Pluralist theories represent a new development in 
response to the standoff between the theories described 
above. Generally, many philosophers do wish to 
maintain a substantive version of truth and do see 
correspondence theory as the most intuitive approach; 
thus, in response to the criticisms of correspondence, 
they have developed the general idea that there may be 
different versions of truth depending on the domain of 
knowledge concerned. There are three possible 
approaches (Pedersen & Wright, 2013a).  The first is 
strong pluralism, which sees many versions of truth 
with no overarching unity to them—a position not held 
by many. The second is weak pluralism, which holds 
 
3 From the Greek, alethia, meaning truth 
that truth is one and many, i.e., that there is a general 
conception of truth, often characterized in terms of a 
number of properties that all forms of truth must have 
(called platitudes or truisms), which is realized 
differently in different domains. And, the third is what 
could be called correspondence pluralism, which 
maintains that there is only correspondence theory but 
that this itself can be differentially realized. However, 
some argue that this is not properly alethic 3  pluralism 
(Barnard & Horgan, 2013). 
Putnam (1994) proposes that there are many ways in 
which propositions can relate to reality and that, 
therefore, the word “true” may be realized differently, 
depending on whether we are talking about physical 
reality, mathematics, or morality. Lynch (1998) 
followed this up with a functionalist approach asking 
what the functions of truth are—e.g., objective, correct 
to believe, and aimed at facilitating inquiry—
suggesting that these functions could be met in 
different ways. Pedersen and Wright (2013c) provide a 
state-of-the-art view of alethic pluralism (Smith, 
2015). In order to avoid burdening the paper, we 
discuss these approaches to truth pluralism in 
Appendix A. 
The main point for this paper is the argument that truth 
is a vital component of knowledge and thus of great 
importance for IS research and, further, that a pluralist 
view of truth is most compatible with the many 
domains and approaches of IS research. 
3 Correctness and Truth 
3.1 Correctness 
While truth may be seen as the constituting feature of 
valid knowledge, there are domains of IS in which it 
does not seem so appropriate, at least in any but its 
pragmatist forms. Examples include design science, 
which is concerned with the design of effective and 
efficient computer systems, and action research, where 
the aim is effective problem-solving in organizations. 
It does not seem appropriate to talk of a computer 
system being “true,” but we can say that it is working 
“correctly.” Correctness is clearly related to truth: 
Horgan (2001; see Appendix A) talks of truth as 
“semantic correctness” and Floridi (2011b) discusses a 
“correctness theory of truth.” In this section, we will 
explore the notion of correctness with a view toward 
evaluating whether it might be a more appropriate term 
for at least some information systems. Based on its 
dictionary definition, correctness can mean three 
things: true or conforming with the facts, in accordance 
with accepted standards, and free from error. The third 
definition is essentially the obverse of the first two, 
leaving us with two—the first as a synonym for truth, 
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at least as correspondence, and the second, wider 
meaning as conforming to some accepted or agreed- 
upon standards or norms (Finlay, 2010).  
Many things may be said to be correct or incorrect: 
mental states such as believing or knowing, actions or 
performances such as a statistical analysis or a logon 
procedure, representations such as a map or a computer 
model, information, a move in a game, and an English 
sentence. What do all these things have in common and 
how does this relate to truth?  
Thomson (2008), in a major work on norms, claims 
that correctness has two aspects. First, correctness is 
always relative to what it is applied to. A map of 
England may be correct as a map of England, but not 
correct in general. Correct is an attributive adjective 
like “good,” it is always relative to a particular kind, K. 
The kind, K, fixes what properties the thing needs to 
have to be correct, essentially an exemplar of what the 
kind (or set) K would be. Note that some kinds of 
things do not have such exemplars, e.g., pebbles or 
shades of gray, and so cannot be correct or incorrect.  
Second, with some kinds of things there are, in fact, 
two different ways that something may be said to be 
correct. Consider an action like asserting the 
proposition: “The computer system is down this 
morning.” The first form of correctness concerns the 
manner in which the assertion is made: Is it correct 
English such that it makes sense and is 
comprehensible? This, Thomson calls “internal-
correctness” or “i-correctness.” Many other actions 
can be said to be correct or incorrect in this sense, for 
example playing a piece of music or spelling a word.  
But with an assertion, there is a second form of 
correctness—that is, whether the proposition it asserts 
is correct, i.e., is the computer system actually down? 
Thomson calls this “external-correctness” or e-
correctness. In the case of an assertion, e-correctness is 
the same as truth: Is the proposition true? This is also 
the case for other speech acts such as describing, 
answering, reporting, or explaining.  
In short, an instance of one or other of these 
speech act kinds is internal-correct just in 
case the speaker carries out the speech 
enterprise correctly, and external-correct 
just in case the propositional content of his 
act is true. (Thomson, 2008, p. 99) 
One further aspect of these forms of correctness is that 
i-correctness is normative, i.e., there is the manner in 
which something ought to be done; but e-correctness is 
descriptive—it describes whether something is true or 
not, or successful or not. Also, the two are independent 
of each other—we can have an i-correct assertion of 
something false, or an i-incorrect assertion of 
something true (if we could understand it). However, 
Sosa (2009) argues that there should be a relationship 
between the two. For an action to be overall correct, 
the e-correctness must actually be caused by the i-
correctness rather than being merely coincidental. For 
example, the correct working of an IT system should 
be a result of the correct procedures being used in its 
development. 
There are many other kinds of actions that have both 
forms, especially purposeful actions. Here i-
correctness concerns the manner in which the action is 
performed and e-correctness concerns whether the goal 
or purpose is, in fact, achieved. However, there are 
some actions that do not have an external relationship 
and so can only have i-correctness, for example 
playing a piece of music or spelling a word. 
We can also consider mental states, such as believing, 
expecting, or assuming, that can be said to be correct. 
In these instances, Thomson argues that there can only 
be e-correctness—as believing or expecting is simply 
a mental state, it cannot be performed in a more or less 
correct way. Again, with these kinds of actions, e-
correctness is essentially truth. 
Engel (2013) considers the case of beliefs (which 
could, of course, be manifested in terms of 
propositions or statements) and agrees that the e-
correctness is, in fact, truth—beliefs are e-correct 
when they are true. However, he argues that beliefs 
also have i-correctness because i-correctness concerns 
our evidential reasons (warrants) for believing things, 
which becomes normative in the sense that we should 
believe things backed by strong evidence, whether or 
not they are, in fact, true. 
This provides an interesting if somewhat circular 
relation to truth. From the correctness perspective, 
many things may be correct or incorrect, but for beliefs 
(and their manifestation in propositions or statements) 
their e-correctness is a matter of truth (however 
construed): if they are true, they are correct. But from 
the truth perspective, for Horgan (2001) and Floridi 
(2011b) at least, truth is a matter of correctness in some 
form. This may appear circular, but it is a benign 
circularity, as we shall show in the next section—in 
some domains, truth and correctness are the same 
property.  
3.2 A Model for Correctness and Truth 
This section constructs a model for combining 
correctness and truth based on the ideas in the above 
discussion. 
Thomson’s distinction between e- and i-correctness is 
fundamental and is identical to distinctions made in 
other fields. In particular, Thomson’s distinction is 
essentially the same as Horgan’s (2001) distinction 
(see Appendix A) made between the semantic 
standards of a domain (i-correctness), and the 
correspondence relations between assertions and the 
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way the world is (e-correctness). For Horgan, all 
(discursive) domains have i-correctness, assuming 
they are coherent and well-formed domains, while 
some have direct e-correctness and some only indirect 
e-correctness (see Appendix A.3 on pluralist truth 
theories for more on this). 
Thomson’s distinction is also the same as the 
distinction made within the context of model and 
research validation (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001; 
Kleijnen, 1995; Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Lee et al., 
2014; Lee & Hovorka, 2015; Lukka & Modell, 2010; 
Sargent, 2013; Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). 
Although different terms may be used, essentially there 
are two distinct stages to model validation, which we 
will call verification and validation. Verification 
concerns the internal structure of the model, whether it 
is a statistical model, a simulation model, or, indeed, a 
piece of interpretive research. Validation concerns the 
external aspect of the model—whether it adequately 
represents what it models. Thus, verification is i-
correctness and validation is e-correctness. Within 
statistics and measurement theory, these are often 
termed precision (the degree of replicability of 
repeated measurements) and accuracy (the closeness of 
the measurement to the quantity’s true value). 
We briefly explain the model here and then look at 
particular parts in more detail in the context of 
information systems. In Table 1, we show how e- and 
i-correctness manifest themselves in various domains. 
The first column shows the kinds of things we are 
looking at—the first four rows come from Thomson’s 
(2008) discussions of correctness, and we added the 
second four because they are more relevant to 
information systems. We do not claim that this list is 
exhaustive. In the next two columns, we propose how 
e- and i-correctness can be evaluated for each of the 
domains. We explain this in more detail below. 
Representation covers a range of things that may have 
different purposes—for example, a picture or photo 
may just describe something, a theory may explain 
why something happened, a simulation model may try 
to replicate behavior. Whether these things are e-
correct or not depends both on their correspondence 
but also on their purpose—e.g., a map of the London 
underground is not correct in terms of walking the 
streets. 
 
Table 1. The Concept of Correctness Applied to Different Domains 
Entity to which “correctness” may 
be applied 
Appropriate type of i-correctness Appropriate type of e-correctness 
Doxastic mental states, e.g., believing, 
guessing, hypothesizing 
Whether the belief is supported by 
sound evidence 
Whether the belief is, in fact, the case 
(truth to different degrees) 
Factive mental states, e.g., knowing, 
perceiving 
Not relevant except that they are 
coherently expressed 
True by definition 
Assertions, propositions, sentences Whether the assertion meets the 
semantic standards of the domain 
including justification 
Whether what is asserted is the case 
(truth) 
Representations, e.g., maps, pictures, 
models, descriptions, theories 
Whether they meet the standards and 
norms for the type 
The extent to which they correspond 
with that which they represent given 
their purpose (truth, practicality) 
Procedures, e.g., a mathematical proof, 
logging into a computer account 
Whether it follows the rules or axioms Whether it succeeds (e.g., hacking an 
account would be e-correct but not i-
correct) 
Information Whether the signs carrying the 
information are semantically 
meaningful 
Whether the content of the information 
is true. This depends on what the 
information is about (truth of different 
kinds) 
Actions, e.g., playing a game, tying a 
tie, performing a sonata, riding a bike 
Whether they are performed in the 
right way according to the standards or 
rules 
Whether it produces the right result 
Normative kinds of artifacts, which 
may be good or defective, e.g., 
machines, computer systems 
Whether it exemplified the standards 
appropriate to its kind (form) 
Whether the object has the properties 
that would make it a “good” example 
of its kind (function) 
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Procedures are specified steps that need to be 
undertaken to achieve a result. A mathematical proof 
does not correspond to anything; nevertheless, starting 
from axioms and following logical rules, it can 
generate a conclusion. It is i-correct in terms of 
adhering to axioms, rules, and other potential criteria 
such as elegance or simplicity. It is e-correct in that if 
it succeeds, it demonstrates the desired result—for 
example, that the four-color theorem is, in fact, true. 
Logging into an account is e-correct if it succeeds. It 
may not be i-correct if done in the wrong way, for 
example by hacking. 
Information is a disputed phenomenon with different 
conceptions (McKinney & Yoos, 2010). Some 
researchers, such as Floridi (2011a) and Mingers and 
Standing (Mingers & Standing, 2017), argue that 
information is both objective and true, in which case 
its i-correctness is its semantic meaningfulness and its 
e-correctness is its truth in some form. Others 
(Checkland & Holwell, 1998b) argue that information 
is subjective and not necessarily true, making it 
difficult to understand what might constitute correct 
information. 
There are many artifacts, especially those that are 
humanly produced, that may have the property of 
“being a good K,” if there are standards or properties 
that exemplars of such a kind exhibit. A good toaster 
produces evenly browned toast; a good information 
system produces information that is accurate, timely, 
relevant, and easy to use. For these examples, the e-
correctness involves meeting the specified goodness 
criteria, which may often be in terms of function. The 
i-correctness concerns the form of the artifact—is it 
aesthetically pleasing? Is it robust and easy to use? Is 
it efficient? Is it economical? In such cases, there may 
be disagreements about which properties are part of the 
function and which are part of the form. 
In summary, correctness has two aspects—internal and 
external. Internal aspects are normative, i.e., some 
example of a K is as it should be; external aspects are 
descriptive, i.e., some example of a K bears an 
appropriate relationship to an external state or a goal. 
Correctness is an attributive adjective that may be 
applied to a wide range of entities or actions. In some 
cases, e-correctness is essentially the same as truth— 
although not necessarily in terms of correspondence 
theory—in other cases it is not. Truth is thus a subset 
of correctness. 
4 Applying the Framework to 
Information Systems 
We began by highlighting the importance of 
knowledge for IS and argue that knowledge is 
constituted by truth, i.e., something must be true to be 
considered knowledge (as opposed to mere opinion or 
belief); however, as discussed above, proving 
something to be true can be extremely difficult. This 
led us to the concept of truth and we investigated 
various theories of truth, especially the pluralist 
versions of truth that see it as many and one. From 
here, we considered the intimate connections between 
truth and the wider concept of correctness, which could 
be said to subsume truth. We then developed a 
framework for analyzing the nature of internal and 
external correctness in several domains. In the 
remainder of the paper, we apply this framework to a 
range of concepts and phenomena within information 
systems. 
In actuality, the concept of truth itself is seldom 
discussed in IS research papers (Becker & Niehaves, 
2007; Webb, 2004), even though there are many papers 
that debate the nature of validity for different forms of 
research (Johnson et al., 2006). As discussed above, 
there are two distinct questions concerning truth: What 
is it, i.e., what is its nature? And, how do we discover 
it, i.e., how do we distinguish true theories from false 
ones? We call these the definitional and the 
justificational questions. The first part of the paper 
concerns itself with the first question, and we now 
move to the second, practical question: How do we 
justify our research conclusions? 
Developing a framework that could potentially apply 
across all research approaches in IS is clearly a tall 
order, and in this paper, we only have enough space to 
cover what we consider to be the most prominent 
approaches (Galliers, Markus, & Newell, 2006; 
Galliers & Land, 1987; Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; 
Hirschheim, Iivari, & Klein, 1997; Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1989, 2006; Lee & Hubona, 2009; Nissen, 
Klein, & Hirscheim, 1991; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991; Venkatesh et al., 2013). In particular, we cover 
positivist, interpretive, critical, action research, and 
design science. However, we recognize that there are 
other approaches that we are unable to address here, 
for example NeuroIS (Reidl, 2018), feminist research 
(Wilson, 2016), and, of course, new areas that are 
continually developing. As stated above, we do not 
wish our framework to be seen as rigid and we 
welcome contributions from other approaches. Even 
concerning a particular approach, we have had to be 
selective in our choice of perspectives—a whole paper 
or even a book could be devoted to a discussion of 
validity within any particular domain. Essentially, we 
focus on trying to show that there are potential 
underlying commonalities across varied research 
approaches and that an awareness and consideration of 
these approaches could potentially contribute to higher 
quality research.
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Table 2. The Correctness Framework for Selected IS Research Approaches 
Form of research i-correctness (formative) e-correctness (summative) Relevant forms of truth 
Positivist research: 
statistical—positivist 
as defined by Straub 
(1989) and Lee & 
Hubona (2009) 
• Content 
• Construct 
• Reliability 
• Statistical validity 
• Comparison of 
predictions with 
actuality, e.g., hold-out 
samples or cross-
validation 
• Elimination of 
alternative explanations 
• Correspondence between 
constructs and concepts, and 
between results and actuality 
• Coherence of constructs 
Positivist research: 
simulation and 
mathematical 
modeling 
• Model comparison 
• Extreme conditions 
• Degeneracy tests 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• Replications 
• Predictive validation 
• Historical data 
• Event validation 
• Face validation 
• Graphical animation 
• Credibility 
• Correspondence between 
results and actuality 
• Coherence of model 
• Pragmatism and consensus 
about operational validity 
Interpretive 
research—emic 
• Confirmability 
• Dependability 
• Consistency 
• Reliability 
• Transgressive validity 
• Credibility/authenticity 
in the eyes of the 
participants/subjects 
• Interpretive coherence 
• Pragmatic coherence: 
consistency between talk 
and action 
• Performativity—the 
stranger test 
• Correspondence between 
description and participants’ 
world 
• Consensus about 
authenticity of results 
• Coherence of 
interpretations 
Interpretive 
research—etic  
• Theoretical validity—
comparison of results with 
theory 
• Plausibility in the eyes 
of the research 
community 
• Consensus about the 
plausibility of theoretical 
interpretation 
Design research • Methodological validity 
• Efficiency 
• Ethicality 
• Elegance 
• Efficacy that the system 
works 
• Effectiveness that it does 
the right thing 
• Pragmatism and consensus 
about operational success 
• Coherence of design 
method 
Action research • Declaration of theory and 
methodology 
• Active application of 
theory and participation in 
a situation 
• Recoverability 
• Effectiveness that the 
problematic issue has 
been alleviated 
• Justification of 
theoretical contribution 
• Generalizability to other 
contexts 
• Pragmatism and consensus 
about operational success 
• Consensus about the 
plausibility of theoretical 
learning 
• Coherence of results with 
methods used 
Critical research • Critical perspective and 
use of critical theories 
• Participative research 
design 
• Analysis of underlying, 
coercive mechanisms 
• Comparison with other 
contexts 
• Researcher reflexivity 
• Enlightenment of 
individual participant 
• Change of social 
arrangements 
• Judged by the 
participants 
• Correspondence of theory 
to social mechanisms 
• Pragmatism and consensus 
about enlightenment and 
change 
 
Our framework as a whole is presented in Table 2. The 
subsequent sections explain how the table is developed 
for the various research approaches. Columns 2 and 3 
concern i-correctness and e-correctness, respectively. 
We note, based on the discussion above, that i-
correctness is essentially the same as verification, 
precision, or formative validity (terms used in various 
fields) and is normative. E-correctness, in contrast, is 
essentially identical to validation, accuracy, or 
summative validity and is descriptive. As we consider 
each research area, we will look at the practice and 
terminology of that area and then endeavor to show 
that it can be incorporated within our correctness 
Using a Pluralist View of Truth to Validate IS Research  
 
124 
framework. Column 4 presents particular forms of 
truth that are relevant to the research approach.4 
4.1 Justifying Positivist Research 
Within IS, there is a considerable literature devoted to 
justifying empirical, positivist research. There is a 
strong line of good practice recommendations 
developed mainly from Cook and Campbell’s (1979) 
treatise on quasi-experimentation. This was picked up 
by Straub (1989) and further developed in theoretical 
(Bagozzi, 2011; Im & Straub, 2015; MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002; Straub et al., 2004; Venkatesh et al., 
2013) and empirical studies (Boudreau et al., 2001; 
King & He, 2005). In theory, this approach ties directly 
into our correctness framework: 
We use the term validity to refer to the 
approximate truth of an inference. When we 
say something is valid, we make a 
judgement about the extent to which 
relevant evidence supports that inference as 
being true or correct.…Validity is a 
property of inferences. It is not a property 
of designs or methods (Shadish et al., 2002, 
p. 34) 
Whether this approach ties into our correctness 
framework in practice is more debatable. After 
describing this approach in Table 3, we then critique it 
for being excessively narrow and technically focused 
and for ignoring the more general issues of internal and 
external validity. We then describe an alternative 
approach developed by Lee and Hubona (2009).  
The original work (Campbell, 1957) distinguished 
between internal and external validity (see discussion 
of internal and external correctness above), while Cook 
and Campbell (1979) added construct validity and 
statistical validity. Straub et al. (2004) developed these 
as shown in Table 3 (construct validity becomes a part 
of instrument validity). These forms of validity take on 
quite specific meanings. First, we should note that 
although the title of the paper (Straub et al., 2004) is 
“Validation Guidelines for IS Positivist Research,” 
which is quite general, the guidelines only refer to 
specific forms of statistical research that feature some 
underlying latent, subjective constructs, and 
relationships between them, which are then 
operationalized in terms of particular quantitative 
measures and an instrument used to collect data. 
 
Table 3. Four Forms of Validity for Positivist Research Summarized from Straub et al. (2004) 
Validity type Meaning Means of assessment 
Instrument validity (three subsections: 
content, construct, and reliability) 
Assesses the validity of the research 
instrument, typically a questionnaire or 
experiment 
 
• Content Do the instrument measures adequately reflect 
the content of the construct they are 
measuring?  
Literature review, expert judgment 
• Construct 
o Discriminant 
o Convergent 
o Factorial 
o Nomological 
o Predictive 
Do the measures converge on the construct 
and not on other distinct constructs? 
Statistical methods such as CFA, 
SEM, PCA 
Judgmental comparison 
Quantitative comparison 
• Reliability 
o Consistency 
o Test/retest 
o Split half 
o Interrater 
Are the results/responses repeatable? Cronbach’s alpha 
Internal validity Are there alternative causal explanations for 
the observed data? 
Not discussed 
Statistical validity Are the results sufficiently statistically robust 
that they are unlikely to have occurred by 
chance? 
R-squared, F, SEM 
See Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000 
External validity To what extent can the findings be 
generalized to other populations and settings? 
Not discussed 
 
4 Formative validity is defined by Lee and Hubona (2009) as 
concerned with the process of building a theory; they define 
summative validity as concerned with the result or product 
of the process. 
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The instrument is assumed to be some form of 
questionnaire or, perhaps, an experiment. The title of 
Straub’s (1989) earlier paper, “Validating Instruments 
in MIS Research,” is perhaps more accurate in this 
regard. The point is that there are other forms of 
positivist research beyond surveys and statistics, 
popular as they may be. 
Moreover, most of the discussion concerns the fairly 
technical issues of instrument validity and statistical 
validity, rather than the more general ones of internal 
and external validity. Again, these latter concepts are 
defined quite narrowly and perhaps counterintuitively in 
this approach—internal validity only concerns the 
possibility of there being other causal relationships, i.e., 
explanations, that are not included in the model. In many 
ways, then, internal validity seems like an external 
factor since it makes direct reference to the external 
world beyond the model and cannot really be dealt with 
from a purely internal perspective.  
Equally, the idea that external validity primarily 
concerns the extent to which results can be generalized 
to other populations and settings (King & He, 2005) 
seems mistaken. As Reichardt (2011) argues, the 
fundamental purpose of validation is to assess the truth 
of the inferences made in a model; it is not particularly 
concerned with how wide or narrow those inferences 
are: “As long as a generalization about a causal 
relationship is true, it is externally valid even if the 
generalization is exceedingly narrow” (p. 46). While 
generalizability is an important and much debated (Lee 
& Baskerville, 2003; Lee & Baskerville, 2012; Seddon 
& Scheepers, 2015; Tsang & Williams, 2012), 
characteristic of a statistical finding, it is a separate issue 
from the question of validity. 
We should also note that this approach to validity does 
not properly separate validity from precision (Reichardt, 
2011). One of the fundamental distinctions in statistical 
inference is that between accuracy and precision. An 
estimate or inference may be accurate but imprecise 
(having wide confidence intervals) or it may be 
inaccurate but precise. Validity concerns the accuracy of 
the inference rather than its precision, but these are 
conflated in the validity typology. 
Finally, this approach makes almost no reference to the 
fundamental issue of designing a study in the first place 
in such a way that the eventual results will form valid 
answers to the research questions. It takes for granted 
the development of appropriate constructs, hypotheses 
of the relationships between them, and the initial 
determination of the appropriate measures and data 
collection instrument; yet, these factors are arguably 
much more important for overall validity or correctness 
of the research findings than is instrument validity 
(Johnston & Smith, 2010). As the empirical research 
shows (Boudreau et al., 2001; Jones, 2004; King & He, 
2005; Straub, 1989), in many cases of papers published 
in leading journals, even the most basic aspects such as 
describing and justifying the methods of data collection 
and analysis are absent. 
Lee and Hubona (2009) provide an alternative approach 
to validation. Their primary aim is to produce a 
framework that can apply to both qualitative and 
quantitative research based on the logical forms of 
argument—modus ponens (p implies q; if p, then q) and 
modus tollens (p implies q; if not q, then not p)—which 
they call the MPMT framework. They distinguish 
between formative validity and summative validity 
(taking these terms from education research) and 
suggest that much IS research involves formative 
validity but little summative validity. Formative validity 
is the process of forming or producing the theory or 
inference; thus, this type of validity concerns the extent 
to which the research has correctly followed an accepted 
procedure. Summative validity is a characteristic of the 
sum result or product of the process that has been 
followed. It involves comparing the consequences or 
predictions of the theory with observed evidence 
according to the logic of modus tollens. If a consequence 
or prediction of the theory cannot, in fact, be observed, 
then the theory does not have summative validity and 
could potentially be rejected. Lee and Hubona show that 
this approach can apply to quantitative research, 
qualitative research, and even systems design—a system 
may be designed according to an accepted systems 
design methodology and yet still fail to meet its aims. 
They also argue that, of the two, summative validity is 
more important than formative validity, even though in 
practice it is seldom demonstrated, particularly in 
positivist research. 
In order to generate summative validity in statistical-
type research (which is the content of this particular 
section), Lee and Hubona (2009) argue that statistical 
validity, in the sense of significance tests or confidence 
intervals for various fitted parameters that constitute the 
hypothesized relationship, is not sufficient. This is 
actually part of formative validity. It is also necessary to 
test the theory’s predictive capabilities on out-of-sample 
data points using hold-out samples or cross-validation. 
We should note, however, a very common problem 
pointed out by Lee and Hubona—the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent. If we find that predictions are, 
in fact, correct, does that prove or confirm the theory? 
The answer is unfortunately “no,” since there could 
always be some other explanation that accounts for the 
results. This can be expressed in logic—p implies q; if 
q, then p—which is not a valid inference. This point 
relates to Straub’s issue of internal validity, which 
concerns alternative explanations. We would suggest 
that this internal validity is misnamed and is really 
external or summative validity: in seeking to confirm 
predictions, one must also actively try to eliminate 
alternative explanations (see Section 4.4 on critical 
realism below). 
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In terms of the correctness framework, it seems clear 
that Lee and Hubona’s (2009) approach fits very well. 
Formative validity is essentially identical to internal 
correctness, while summative validity is the same as 
external correctness; the two types of validity are related 
but independent. We would hope that formative validity 
(i-correctness) would lead to summative validity (e-
correctness), but this is not guaranteed. However, it 
would be possible to reach summatively valid research 
conclusions even through research that was formatively 
weak. These conclusions are summarized in the 
“Positivist research—statistical” section of Table 2, 
which presents formative validity through four of 
Straub’s terms and develops summative validity based 
on Lee and Hubona. The primary form of truth is 
correspondence between the model and the actual 
situation or, less strongly, between the results and the 
data if the model is primarily predictive rather than 
explanatory. However, coherence truth also exists 
between the various constructs. 
4.1.1 Other Forms of Positivist Research 
The previous section was primarily concerned with 
statistical-type research, but there are many other 
potentially relevant forms of positivist research, for 
example simulation or mathematical modeling (Galliers 
& Land, 1987). In this section, we briefly consider 
simulation as representative of these. 
Simulation involves building a computer model that is 
intended to replicate the behavior of a real-world system 
of interest. There are three major types—discrete event 
(DES), system dynamics (SD) and agent-based 
modeling (ABM)—which employ different modeling 
techniques but are similar in terms of correctness. 
Simulations are generally developed for a specific 
purpose, e.g., better understanding of a system, 
improvement of a system’s operations, or the design of 
a new system, and therefore involve decision makers 
and others potentially affected by the results. It is 
important that these stakeholders have confidence in the 
correctness of the simulation and its results (Sargent, 
2013). While subject to some debate, the correctness of 
a simulation is generally evaluated in terms of 
verification and validation (Robinson, 1997), although 
its credibility with users is also important (Robinson, 
2002).  
Sargent (2013) discusses simulation correctness in 
terms of three elements: the object system that is to be 
simulated, the conceptual model of that system, and the 
computerized version of that conceptual model. In this 
case, verification concerns the correctness of the model 
and its computer implementation and validation 
 
5 The point that validity is not absolute but relative to purpose 
is seldom mentioned but also applies to the statistical 
modeling discussed above. 
includes three components: conceptual model validation 
that the conceptual model is a correct representation of 
the object system, operational validation that the outputs 
of the computer model are sufficiently accurate with 
respect to the object system for the purpose at hand, and 
data validation that the available data is sufficiently 
correct for model building, evaluation, and testing. 
These three forms of validity are independent but 
interrelated. If the conceptual model is invalid, then it is 
unlikely that the final model will have operational 
validity. If appropriate and valid data are not available, 
then a valid conceptual model could be built but not 
operationalized. It is also important to emphasize that 
validity is not absolute but always relative to the 
purposes of the simulation exercise: to understand 
puzzling behavior, a fairly simple model may be 
sufficient, but to help operate a complex production 
plant the model may need to be highly detailed and 
complex.5 The general advice is to keep the model as 
simple as is possible to meet the objectives (Robinson, 
2007). Credibility depends, to some extent, on validity: 
a verified and validated model should generate 
credibility. However, special steps may be taken to 
improve it—for example, participation by stakeholders 
in the development process and techniques such as hi-
res animated graphical outputs. 
There are many techniques and tests used in verification 
and validation (Sargent, 2013). Verification might 
involve comparison with other models, extreme 
conditions tests, degeneracy tests, sensitivity analysis, 
replications, trace tests, etc., while validity might be 
demonstrated by predictive validation, comparison with 
historical data, event validation, face validation, 
graphical animation, or structured walkthrough. 
In terms of our framework, verification is clearly 
associated with i-correctness and the various forms of 
validation align with e-correctness. Credibility is 
interesting in that it could either be conceived of as 
separate from the correctness of the model, or it could 
be regarded as the ultimate form of e-correctness in that 
if the model is not believable to clients, then it fails, no 
matter how good it is. These aspects of verification and 
validity are also related to different theories of truth 
(Becker, Niehaves, & Klose, 2005; Schmid, 2005). 
Clearly, the primary forms of validity rely on 
correspondence theory, while verification, especially 
comparison with other models, can be seen as associated 
with coherence theory. The issue of credibility can be 
seen as pragmatic/consensus, as rationally acceptable 
under ideal epistemic conditions. These results are 
shown in the second row of Table 2.
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4.2 Justifying Interpretive Research 
Qualitative or interpretive research is a much more 
complex area in terms of validation and truth (Cole & 
Avison, 2007; Goldkuhl, 2012; Lee, 2018; Myers & 
Avison, 2002a, 2002b; Walsham, 2006). First, there is 
a wide variety of methods that differ significantly in 
their ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
from relatively objective postpositivist approaches 
such as grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) or 
“subtle realism” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), to 
textual analyses such as semiotics (Mingers & 
Willcocks, 2014; Mingers & Willcocks, 2017), 
hermeneutics (Cole & Avison, 2007; Myers, 2004; 
Ricoeur, 1981) and discourse analysis (Cukier, 
Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 2009), to highly 
subjectivist or constructivist approaches such as 
phenomenology (Boland, 1985; Introna & Ilharco, 
2004; Mingers, 2001b; Schutz, 1972) and 
poststructuralism (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; 
Foucault, 1980). Second, there is debate even within 
methods regarding whether some form of external or 
even internal validation is possible at all. Seale (1999, 
p. 471), for example, is concerned with quality in 
interpretive research but suggests that 
Quality does matter in qualitative research, 
but the modernist headings of validity and 
reliability no longer seem adequate to 
encapsulate the range of issues that a 
concern for quality must raise. The 
constructivist critique of criteriology has 
led us to see that “quality” is a somewhat 
elusive phenomenon that cannot be 
prespecified by methodological rules.  
He goes on to argue that, because of the critiques of 
extreme subjectivists and postmodernists, we should 
not expect that interpretivist research should rigidly 
follow any philosophical or methodological principles 
or guidelines (as Feyerabend [1975] argued many 
years ago). While this may seem to be directly against 
our intentions, Seale actually ends up rather close to 
them: 
What I would like to see is some sense of 
there being a community of social 
researchers who have respect for the 
strengths of a variety of positions within that 
community, appreciating the need also to 
develop research skills taken from a number 
of genres (quantitative as well as qualitative, 
in fact) (p. 476) 
We see our framework as potentially helping this 
process by exploring underlying commonalities among 
research genres. Where we differ from Searle, perhaps, 
is in believing that research in each genre can benefit 
from some guidelines as to what constitutes high-
quality research in that genre.  
Sandberg (2005, p. 46) states: 
At the same time as advocates of interpretive 
research deny the possibility of producing 
objective knowledge, they want to claim that 
the knowledge they generate is true in some 
way or another. But how can they justify their 
knowledge as true if they deny the idea of 
objective truth? 
Sandberg’s goal is actually similar to ours in that “it is 
argued here that although objective truth cannot be 
achieved, truth claims are feasible using criteria 
consistent with the basic assumptions underlying a 
research approach” (p. 47). He goes on to say: “This 
strategy…allows us to speak about justification or 
‘correctness’ of a knowledge claim. Here, 
‘correctness’ does not mean representation of 
objective reality but rather a process of justification” 
(p. 52, our italics). Sandberg’s “correctness” is, in our 
terms, i-correctness, and with it comes the possibility 
of e-correctness. 
Papers in IS that provide guidance on doing 
interpretive research generally fail to discuss validity. 
For example, Klein and Myers’s (1999) authoritative 
paper provides seven principles that should be applied 
in interpretive research (primarily limited to 
hermeneutics) but say little about validation principles. 
Similarly, Sarker et al. (2013) review empirical studies 
and also offer guiding principles but do not discuss 
validation. 
Interpretive research begins from the position that its 
object of study, whether actions, texts, beliefs or 
discourse, is socially constructed by the actors 
involved. Therefore, its primary task is to gain an 
authentic understanding (Verstehen) of that meaning in 
the terms of the actors who produce it rather than in 
terms of theory or the interpretations of the 
researchers. For some researchers, e.g., ethnographers, 
that is sufficient, whereas others would wish to go 
further by interpreting the results and perhaps relating 
them to theory.  
Moving to possible validity criteria, some of the first 
were proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985; Seale, 
1999; Shenton, 2004) as a direct analog to the criteria 
for positivist research discussed (and criticized) above: 
internal validity—credibility; external validity—
transferability; statistical validity—confirmability; and 
reliability—dependability. Lincoln and Guba (1986) 
later argued  that these criteria are overly influenced by 
the concerns of positivist research and suggested that 
these four criteria constituted the trustworthiness of 
research but that other conditions concerned with the 
wider application and results of the inquiry (which they 
called term authenticity) were also needed. These 
conditions include fairness, sophistication, 
enlightenment, and empowerment to act. However, as 
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Seale (1999) points out, these rather “political” 
commitments are themselves highly value laden. 
Maxwell (1992) suggested three forms of validity 
based partly on different stages of the project. The first 
is descriptive validity, which solely concerns the 
quality of the data production process: that it is 
comprehensive, accurate and not subject to dispute 
(although the participants may themselves hold 
different and perhaps contradictory viewpoints, which 
should be faithfully recorded). The second is 
interpretive validity, which goes beyond merely 
recording events, actions, and discourse to generating 
interpretations of it; however, interpretive validity still 
proceeds from the participants’ point of view not the 
researchers. Interpretive validity has thus been 
described as an “emic” viewpoint rather than an “etic” 
one (Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990)—as an insider 
viewpoint rather than an outsider viewpoint. 
Interpretive validity involves the faithfulness or 
authenticity of the account to those involved, but even 
here the boundaries are blurred because actors are not 
always fully transparent to themselves and, as Giddens 
(1979) emphasizes, there are often unknown 
conditions and motivations for action. The third form 
of validity is theoretical validity, which moves away 
from an emic account to an etic one. The researcher 
aims to develop theories to explain particular observed 
behaviors. Theory could come from within, as in the 
case of grounded theory, where the theory is developed 
internally from the research material, or theory could 
come from without, when theory that already exists is 
applied to explain a given situation.6  
Sandberg (2005), like us, is concerned with validity as 
truth—in his case, being truthful to lived experience 
within whichever theoretical or methodological 
perspective is adopted. He also distinguishes reliability 
(i-correctness in our terms) as concerning the 
procedures for achieving truthful interpretations. 
Reliability concerns the researcher’s own subjective 
awareness of their (unavoidable) subjectivity and 
potential bias (Kvale, 1995). Researchers need to strive 
to avoid bias in terms of selection and analysis of 
material and to recognize their “perspectival 
subjectivity,” which cannot ultimately be avoided 
(Gadamer, 1975).  
Sandberg proposes three different aspects of validity: 
communicative validity, pragmatic validity, and 
transgressive validity. Communicative validity aims 
for coherence—coherence of understanding between 
researcher and participants, coherence in a 
hermeneutic sense within the interpretation of the 
 
6  Maxwell does discuss two other forms of validity—
generalizability and evaluative validity. We consider the 
former, as argued in the section on quantitative research, to 
be orthogonal to the primary question of truth and validity. 
material, and coherence between the researcher and 
other researchers and participants within the practice. 
Pragmatic validity aims for consistency between what 
the participants say and what they actually do. This is 
necessary because participants’ accounts are not 
always open and honest since they may be mediated by 
politics, storytelling, social codes, or impression 
management (Alvesson, 2003). Transgressive validity 
is orthogonal to the other two types of validity and 
seeks ambiguity, complexity, and contradiction. 
Lee and Hubona (2009; Lee, 2018) argue that their 
MPMT framework applies equally to interpretive 
research. They give the example of the hermeneutic 
understanding of a text (in terms of summative 
validity), which maintains that if a researcher has a 
correct interpretation of a text, then it should be 
consistent with any particular passage or set of 
passages (MP). But, if a contradiction arises, then that 
implies that the interpretation is not correct (MT). 
They suggest that this approach is a realization of the 
hermeneutic circle. This is the only actual example 
they give, but they do analyze a set of interpretive 
papers and find that all but one discuss formative 
validity alone, in terms of the processes employed; 
they do not try to test their interpretation in a 
summative way. For testing summative validity in 
research approaches other than hermeneutics, they 
follow Sanday’s (1979) and Schutz’s (1962) proposals 
that the interpretation should be understandable and 
acceptable to actors in a situation and should 
potentially enable a stranger to act appropriately within 
the culture (the stranger test). We can call this aspect 
of validity authenticity. 
Venkatesh et al. (2013), based on a consideration of 
several of the above typologies, suggest another 
threefold classification of validity: design validity 
(which includes descriptive validity, credibility, and 
transferability); analytical validity (which includes 
theoretical validity, dependability, consistency, and 
plausibility); and inferential validity (which includes 
interpretive validity and confirmability). In 
comparison with Maxwell’s typology, Venkatesh et 
al.’s classification seems rather confusing to us. 
Design validity actually includes elements of 
descriptive and interpretive validity (i.e., it is 
concerned with the validity of the process) mixed with 
generalizability. Analytical validity seems to include 
elements of both interpretive validity and theoretical 
validity, and inferential validity seems to go back to 
interpretive validity rather than to inferences beyond 
the situation.
The question of evaluation, i.e., judging actions to be right or 
wrong, will be further considered below in Section 4.4 on 
critical research. 
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Table 4. Summary of Five Different Types of Criteria for Interpretive Research                                             
Developed from the Literature Review 
Reliability:      
criteria concerning 
the research process 
Validity:             
criteria concerning the 
results from the 
participant viewpoint 
Theory:          
criteria concerning 
the relationship to 
theories 
Plausibility:    
criteria concerning 
the relationship to 
other researchers 
Applicability: 
criteria concerning 
the generalizability 
of the results 
Confirmability:    
that the research is 
carried out and 
documented in a self-
critical way 
Dependability: 
researcher bias and 
subjectivity is 
recognized and 
minimized 
Consistency:         
that the research 
process has been 
carried out in a 
systematic manner 
Reflexivity:           
that the researcher is 
aware of potential 
biases and also their 
subjective/theoretical 
perspectives 
Transgressive validity:                 
that the researcher 
seeks contradictions 
and anomalies in the 
data 
 
Credibility/ 
authenticity/ 
descriptive:            
that the results 
faithfully record the 
participants’ 
experiences and 
beliefs as judged by 
the participants 
Interpretive:          
going beyond pure 
description to 
interpretations/ 
explanations but still 
in the participants’ 
terms 
Coherence:             
that the interpretation 
makes sense as a whole 
hermeneutically 
Pragmatic:               
that there is 
consistency between 
what the participants 
say and what they 
actually do 
Performativity:          
“the stranger test” 
Theoretical:              
the extent to which 
the results are used to 
generate new theory 
or existing theories 
are used to explain the 
results 
 
Plausibility:          
that the results are 
believable, realistic 
and persuasive to 
other researchers 
Transferability/ 
applicability:              
the extent to which 
the results could be 
applied in other 
contexts 
This whole area is clearly complex and confusing in its 
terminology. In Table 4 we summarize the concepts in 
terms of the research process and the relationships of the 
research results to four other entities: the participants, 
other researchers, existing theory, and results in other 
contexts.  
Based on our validity and correctness point of view, we 
wish to articulate a classification that is quite general and 
compatible with many of the particular approaches. We 
would therefore make one main distinction, that between 
emic and etic research. In emic research (which must 
necessarily come before etic research), the primary 
concern is with reproducing in as authentic and rich a 
manner as possible, the way of life of the actors within a 
situation of interest in their own terms. This includes both 
descriptive and interpretive validity in Maxwell’s model. 
Some research, for instance descriptive ethnography, may 
choose to stop there but, increasingly, there is a view that 
 
7 It may seem contradictory that theoretical validity criteria 
(from Column 3 Table 4) could form part of formative i-
correctness in Table 2 since theory is normally the result of 
a research process and thus summative or e-correct. But, in 
even ethnographic research should move toward some 
form of explanation (Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & 
Kuorikoski, 2008; Lukka & Modell, 2010). This 
viewpoint would move research toward etic research, 
which is either based on or generates theory, is expressed 
in the researcher’s language, and must be plausible to the 
research community. This is congruent with Cole and 
Avison’s (2007) use of the trustworthiness of the research 
process and the truthfulness of the results. Based on our 
correctness framework, both emic and etic research will 
have both i-correctness (formative) and e-correctness 
(summative) validity criteria, as shown in Table 2. 
Column 1 of Table 4 essentially provides the i-correctness 
criteria for the emic research described in Table 2, and 
Column 2 of Table 4 provides the e-correctness criteria 
for the emic research in Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 
4 provide the i- and e-correctness criteria, respectively, for 
the etic research described in Table 2.7 We do not feel that 
this particular case, the process of etic research involves 
theory comparison or construction; thus, it is reasonable that 
theoretical considerations form part of the i-correctness 
criteria. 
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generalizability (included in Table 4) is relevant for 
correctness. 
In terms of the truth criteria in Table 2, correspondence 
does play a part, in that the research aims to 
authentically mirror the participants’ world even 
though the authenticity of the mirroring can only be 
judged by the participants. Coherence is also relevant 
in assessing the overall interpretation and consensus, in 
that participants judge authenticity and other 
researchers judge the plausibility of the results. 
4.3 Justifying System Design: Design 
Science and Action Research 
We consider these two somewhat different approaches 
together for two reasons. First, they share purposes that 
make them different from the research approaches we 
have thus far considered: that is, they both aim to bring 
about beneficial changes in organizations, one through 
the development of an IT artifact, the other through 
problem solving, which might include the development 
of artifacts. Second, these similarities have already 
been noted in the literature (Baskerville, Pries-Heje, & 
Venable, 2009; Järvinen, 2007; Lee, 2007; Sein, 
Henfridsson, Purao, Rossi, & Lindgren, 2011; 
Wieringa & Moralı, 2012), although Iivari and Venable 
(2009) suggest that the similarities may not be deep. 
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of validation they do 
have significant commonalities. 
Design science is concerned with producing new and 
innovative IT artifacts to solve organizational problems 
(Hevner et al., 2004), although Lee et al. (2015) point 
out that such artifacts should be termed IS artifacts, not 
just IT artifacts. As Hevner et al. (2004, p. 78) note, 
“design is both a process (set of activities) and a product 
(artifact)—a verb and a noun” and this concords with 
the two aspects of correctness in our framework—i-
correctness (formative) as conforming to a process or 
methodology, and e-correctness (summative), as 
successfully achieving a goal or purpose (in this case, 
in terms of organizational stakeholders). 
Various proposals have been made for a design science 
methodology (Gregor & Jones, 2007; Hart & Gregor, 
2010; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2008). These proposals 
that have been integrated by Peffers et al. (2007) into 
the following general stages (we include Hevner et al’s 
[2004] guidelines in parentheses where appropriate): 
1. Problem identification and motivation (2. 
Problem relevance) 
2. Define objectives for solution (6. Design as a 
search process) 
3. Design and development (1. Design as an artifact; 
5. Research rigor) 
4. Demonstration (4. Research contributions; 7. 
Communication of research) 
5. Evaluation (3. Design evaluation) 
Note that here the fifth step is actually an evaluation— 
in particular, an evaluation of whether the artifact does 
indeed meet the objectives that were required of it 
(summative or e-correctness).  
Venable et al. (2012) have developed a detailed and 
comprehensive framework of different methods for 
assessing both formative and summative validity. It is 
based initially on the 5E’s approach to evaluation 
(Checkland & Scholes, 1990)—efficacy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, elegance, and ethicality. Of these, 
efficacy and effectiveness primarily concern 
summative validity, while the other three concern 
formative validity. Efficacy is the extent to which the 
artifact performs as it is designed to, and effectiveness 
is the extent to which performing those tasks is actually 
successful in the organizational context: Does 
performing those tasks do what it is supposed to do? Is 
that the right thing to do? 
In terms of formative validity, the researcher must first 
evaluate whether the artifact was designed according to 
a rigorous methodology of some kind? Then, one must 
question whether the artifact was developed with an 
economical use of resources (efficiency), according to 
ethical principles, and, ultimately, elegantly and 
aesthetically (e.g., the Mac vs. the PC)? One would like 
to think that formative validity would lead to 
summative validity, but unfortunately the high number 
of IS failures that still happen (Dwivedi, Wastell, 
Laumer, Henriksen, Myers, Bunker, Elbanna, 
Ravishankar, & Srivastava, 2014; Georgiadou & 
George, 2006) demonstrate that this is not the case. 
These forms of validity are presented in Table 5 and are 
also included in Table 2. In relation to truth, the primary 
form would clearly be pragmatism because it 
demonstrates that the system works effectively and 
offers consensus about that (although there can be 
disagreement about whether a system is successful or 
not). Pragmatism also looks for coherence in terms of 
the design method used and its results. 
We now move to action research; however, as we have 
shown, many consider action research and design 
science to be intimately linked. Nevertheless, we will 
deal with them separately in terms of validation, even 
though Wieringa and Morah (2012) actually define the 
concept of “technical action research” as a specific 
method for evaluating design science. Action research 
(AR) (Checkland & Holwell, 1998a; Eden & Huxham, 
1996) has a long history dating back to Kurt Lewin 
(1946) and comes in many varieties including action 
learning (Revons, 1993), action science (Argyris, 
Putnam, & Smith, 1985) and participatory action 
research (Whyte, 1991). Action research has repeatedly 
been recommended for IS research (Baskerville & 
Wood-Harper, 1998; Baskerville, 1999; Chiasson et al., 
2009; Davison, Martinsons, & Kock, 2004). 
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Table 5. Summary of Different Types of Criteria for Design Research 
I-correctness (formative) E-correctness (summative) Truth 
Methodological correctness 
• Does the design follow a 
methodology declared in advance? 
Efficacy 
• Does the system perform in the 
desired manner for the appropriate 
users? 
Pragmatism and consensus as to the 
extent of practical success 
Coherence of the methodological 
process 
Efficiency 
• Does the design process use a 
minimum of resources? 
• Does the designed system use a 
minimum of resources? 
Effectiveness 
• Does the system’s performance 
contribute to the goals of the wider 
system of which it is a part? 
 
Elegance 
• Does the designed system incorporate 
appropriate aesthetic and ergonomic 
principles? 
  
Ethicality 
• Does the system operate according to 
ethical principles? 
  
 
Table 6. Summary of Different Types of Criteria for Action Research 
I-correctness (formative) E-correctness (summative) Truth 
• Declaration of theory and 
methodology 
• Active application of theory and 
participation in a situation 
• Recoverability 
• Effectiveness: that the problematic 
issue has been alleviated 
• Justification of theoretical 
contribution 
• Generalizability to other contexts 
Pragmatism and consensus about 
operational success 
Consensus about the plausibility of 
theoretical learning 
Coherence of results with methods 
used 
 
Given the variety of action research types, we consider 
a very broad description of AR as being constituted by 
several elements performed in a cyclical manner: 
1. Initial recognition of problematic issue and entry 
of researcher 
2. Declaration of theories and methodologies 
thought to be relevant 
3. Undertaking action to improve the situation as 
both participant and researcher (in participatory 
AR the actors are also seen as participant 
researchers) 
4. Evaluating results in terms of improvement to the 
particular organizational situation 
5. Evaluating results in terms of the 
theory/methodology used to disseminate the 
learning 
Checkland and Holwell (1998a) also emphasize the 
importance of “recoverability,” or the explicit 
documentation of the process followed and decisions 
made, which will help generate theoretical lessons and 
facilitate later critical scrutiny. In terms of the 
correctness or validity of the process (Baskerville & 
Wood-Harper, 1998; Checkland & Holwell, 1998a; 
Eden & Huxham, 1996), we consider i-correctness (in 
Table 2) in terms of the extent to which the AR process 
was followed (declaration of theory, application of 
theory and participation, and recoverability; and e-
correctness in terms of two distinct criteria), the success 
in terms of resolving the problem, and the learning and 
development of theory that may be applicable 
elsewhere. It is the latter criterion that mainly 
distinguishes action research from pure consultancy. 
Forms of truth are similar to design research—
pragmatism in terms of whether an action was 
successful, consensus about that success, and coherence 
between the different parts of the research and the 
results. Our analysis of action research is summarized in 
Table 6 and is also presented in Table 2.  
4.4 Justifying a Critical Approach 
In this section, we will cover a range of explicitly critical 
approaches mainly based on the work of theorists such 
as Bourdieu (Kvasny & Keil, 2006), Foucault 
(Willcocks, 2004) and Habermas (Brocklesby & 
Cummings, 1996; Howcroft & Trauth, 2005; Klein & 
Huynh, 2004; Myers & Klein, 2011; Mingers, 1980), as 
well as critical realism (Johnston & Smith, 2010; 
Mingers, 2004b; Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 2013), 
and critical versions of interpretive approaches such as 
critical ethnography (Myers, 1997) and critical 
discourse analysis (Cukier et al., 2009). A critical 
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approach, or the idea of critique, has two lineages: one 
traceable to Kant and one to Marx (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 
2011; Mingers, 2000). Kantian critique concerns the 
limits of our knowledge and research methods while 
Marxist critique concerns the oppressive nature of 
society. Generally, both are involved in a critical 
approach. However, a critical approach is not primarily 
about research methods but about attitudes and values 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2011; Morrow & Brown, 1994). 
In other words, there are not specific critical research 
methods; rather, both traditional quantitative and 
qualitative are used, but with a critical intent. 
Alvesson and Deetz (2000) provide perhaps the most 
general framework for doing critical research that 
involves three stages: 
• Insight: hermeneutic understanding and the 
archaeology of knowledge. This stage involves 
gaining knowledge and appreciation of the 
situation of interest using a range of ordinary 
research methods, both qualitative and 
quantitative. But, research is guided by explicitly 
critical attitudes and values and views the 
subjects as active participants in the research 
rather than as passive objects.  
• Critique: deconstruction and the genealogy of 
knowledge. This stage involves using varied 
critical theories and constructs to uncover and 
reveal the often hidden or suppressed 
mechanisms that distort the participants’ 
understandings of the situation and act to 
maintain this power differential. 
• Transformative redefinition: enlightenment and 
emancipation. This stage aims at enlightening 
participants to the true nature of the situation and 
thereby helping them bring about change. It also 
reflexively develops social theory. Final validity 
is determined by the judgment of the 
participants. 
 
Table 7. Different Approaches to Critical Research 
Alvesson and 
Deetz (2000) 
Myers & Klein 
(2011) 
Cecez-Kecmanovic 
(2011) 
Johnson et al. (2006) 
based on Kincheloe & 
McLaren (2005) 
Critical realism 
(Bhaskar, 1994; 
Mingers, 2009, 2014) 
Insight • Interpretive 
research 
• Utilize critical 
theories 
 
Critical understanding 
• Critical theory 
concepts 
• Emancipatory 
values 
• Choice of 
research methods 
• Research designs 
that are participative 
and democratic, and 
approximate 
Habermas’s ideal 
speech situation.  
• Reflexive analysis of 
researchers’ interests 
and assumptions  
• Science is value-
laden not value-free 
and should be used 
to understand the 
true nature of 
society 
Critique • Explicitly adopt 
social values 
• Reveal and 
challenge the 
status quo 
Critical explanation 
and generalization 
• Hidden 
mechanisms 
• Wider 
contextualization 
• Social and power 
relations 
• Critical ethnography 
to sensitize 
researchers and 
participants to how 
society distorts the 
subjectivities of 
participants 
• Comparison of 
particular context 
with other 
comparable ones 
• Explanatory 
critique: a critique 
of the false beliefs 
held by social 
actors and the 
social/ 
organizational 
structures that 
maintain them 
 
Transformative 
redefinition 
• Emancipation 
• Improve society 
• Improve social 
theory 
Open discourse 
• Nondistorted 
communication 
• Transformative 
praxis 
• Reflexive 
dialectic 
 
• Catalytic validity: 
the extent to which 
the research changes 
participants’ self-
understandings and 
thereby enable them 
to change the 
situation 
• Credibility for 
participants is vital 
• Theory practice 
consistency: Given 
the explanatory 
critique, this should 
lead to action 
dedicated to 
removing the 
constraints and ills. 
• This should then be 
universalized to 
similar constraints 
and problems in 
other contexts. 
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Table 8. The Correctness Framework (Table 2) Illustrated with Empirical Examples 
I-correctness E-correctness 
Criteria from Table 2 Evaluation of paper in terms of 
criteria 
Criteria from Table 2 Evaluation of paper in terms of 
criteria 
Positivist research (statistical): Mishra & Agarwal (2010), “Technological Frames, Organizational Capabilities, and IT Use: 
An Empirical Investigation of Electronic Procurement” (72 cites) 
• Content 
• Construct 
• Reliability 
• Statistical 
validity 
 
• Content validation was from 
an extensive literature 
review 
• There is an explicit section 
called “Instrument 
validation.” Construct and 
reliability validation was 
provided by EFA, 
Cronbach’s alpha, and other 
tests. Convergent validity 
and discriminant validity 
were also demonstrated. 
• Statistical validity was 
assessed Shapiro-Wilks, VIF 
and other tests on the 
assumptions 
• Comparison of 
predictions with 
actuality, e.g., cross-
validation 
• Elimination of 
alternative 
explanations 
 
• There was no apparent 
summative validation either 
in terms of cross-validation 
or consideration of other 
explanations 
Interpretive research: Staehr (2010) “Understanding the Role of Managerial Agency in Achieving Business Benefits from 
ERP Systems.” (84 cites)  
Emic 
• Confirmability 
• Dependability 
• Consistency 
• Reliability 
• Transgressive 
• It was stated that an 
interpretive case study 
method was used. This 
consisted of semi-
structured interviews with 
24 informants from 4 
organizations. The 
researchers stated they 
were outside observers. It 
was stated that Klein & 
Myers’s seven principles 
were followed but no 
evidence of this was 
supplied. 
• The research was 
documented and Nudist 
was used but there was no 
discussion of researcher 
bias or subjectivity and no 
attempt to seek 
contradictions 
Emic 
• Credibility/ 
authenticity in the 
eyes of the 
participants/ subjects 
• Interpretive 
coherence 
• Pragmatic 
coherence: 
consistency between 
talk and action 
• Performativity—the 
stranger test 
• There is little evidence in the 
paper that any attempt was 
made to check the 
researchers’ interpretations 
and understandings with the 
participants other than giving 
interviewees the transcripts 
of the interviews for 
checking.  
• There was no discussion of 
the reliability or consistency 
of the information the 
participants provided. 
Etic 
• Theoretical 
validity: 
comparison of 
results with theory 
 
• This research did use 
theory—Giddens’s 
structuration theory—as a 
lens to interpret the cases, 
as well as an ERP benefits 
framework 
Etic 
• Plausibility in the 
eyes of the research 
community 
• There is no evidence that the 
results were tested with the 
research community; 
however, publishing the 
paper (and perhaps 
presenting at conferences) 
could be seen as part of that 
process.  
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Critical research: Young, Kuo & Myers (2012), “To Share or Not to Share: A Critical Research Perspective on Knowledge 
Management Systems” (33 cites) 
• Critical 
perspective and 
use of critical 
theories 
• Participative 
research design 
• Analysis of 
underlying, 
coercive 
mechanisms 
• Comparison 
with other 
contexts 
• Researcher 
reflexivity 
 
• The paper explicitly 
discusses validity in terms of 
Myers & Klein’s (2011) 
principles that we include in 
Table 4.  
• In terms of critical theory, 
they use Foucault’s concepts 
of power and gaze. 
• The research design is 
participative. 
• Analyzed coercive 
mechanisms of surveillance 
within the KMS 
• No external comparison 
• No explicit consideration of 
researcher reflexivity 
• Enlightenment of 
individual participant 
• Change of social 
arrangements 
• Judged by the 
participants 
 
• It was not clear that the 
results were fed back to the 
participants or that they 
brought about any change to 
the individuals or society.  
• They argued that a different 
epistemology for KMS was 
provided, which enabled 
participants to emancipate 
themselves from unwanted 
controls. 
Action research:  Puhakainen & Siponen (2010), “Improving Employees’ Compliance Through Information Systems Security 
Training: An Action Research Study” (263 cites) 
• Declaration of 
theory and 
methodology 
• Active application 
of theory and 
participation in a 
situation 
• Recoverability 
 
• The methodology and 
content of the training 
were developed before the 
AR 
• The process, which was 
cyclical, followed the AR 
stages as described by 
Baskerville (1999). A 
training course was 
designed, delivered, and 
evaluated. 
• The process was well 
documented (and indeed 
written up as a paper) and 
so was recoverable for 
future learning 
• Effectiveness, in the 
sense that the 
problematic issue 
was alleviated 
• Justification of 
theoretical 
contribution 
• Generalizability to 
other contexts 
 
• Considerable evidence was 
presented that the training 
resulted in improved security 
consciousness in both the 
employees and the CEO.  
• Key findings from the 
research were reflected back 
onto the initial theory and 
also compared to similar 
studies in other fields. 
Design science research:  Rosenkranz & Holten (2011), “The Variety Engineering Method: Analyzing and Designing 
Information Flows in Organizations” (27 cites) 
• Methodological 
validity 
• Efficiency 
• Ethicality 
• Elegance 
• The research follows the 
stages of Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler (2008) which 
are similar to Venable et 
al. (2012). The viable 
systems model (VSM) 
(Beer, 1985) is used as a 
methodological base.  
• The method was applied 
in several different field 
studies during 
development as “micro- 
evaluations.” 
• In some studies 
improvements in 
efficiency and 
effectiveness were noted 
• Ethicality and elegance 
were not considered 
• Efficacy that the 
system works 
• Effectiveness that it 
does the right thing 
 
• A software prototype was 
developed to demonstrate 
proof of concept although 
this is not an actual, working 
system. 
• Some of the “micro-
evaluations” demonstrated 
improved effectiveness. 
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Table 7 shows how a range of critical research 
approaches can be mapped to Alvesson and Deetz’s 
(2000) three stages. I-correctness concerns the process 
of research and analysis itself and evaluates whether it 
has properly followed the research steps, primarily 
from the Insight and Critique stages presented on Table 
7. We selected a subset of these approaches, since 
many overlap, to form the characterization of i-
correctness given in Table 2. E-correctness concerns 
the actual success of the critical analysis in terms of the 
change of consciousness of the participants and 
changes in oppressive social arrangements. This is 
ultimately judged by the participants themselves rather 
than the researchers. These criteria come from the 
Transformative Redefinition section of Table 7 and, 
again, we included only a subset in Table 2. 
5 Illustration of the Framework 
In order to better illustrate the framework, we applied 
it to a range of case studies as shown in Table 8. This 
is not intended to be exhaustive, but simply illustrative; 
furthermore, it does not constitute a formal validation 
of the framework, which would be a topic for future 
research. However, Table 8 does show that the 
framework can be applied to a wide range of research 
approaches and that it can yield powerful evaluative 
points. In order to select the papers, we searched 
Google Scholar for recent (2010 and later) papers in 
journals with “information systems” in the title that 
used the terms “empirical” or “case study” and the 
appropriate research approach. If there was a choice, 
we selected highly cited papers from top-quality 
journals. The only area that proved difficult in this 
regard was design science; while there were many 
theory and methodology papers, there were few 
empirical examples. In each example in Table 8 we list 
the correctness criteria from Table 2 and then evaluate 
the extent to which each paper meets or adheres to 
these criteria. 
Summarizing the results, the positivist paper met the i-
correctness (as did many others) criterion but not the 
e-correctness criterion, a finding that echoes Lee and 
Hubona’s (2009) results. The interpretive paper met 
some of the criteria but not others. In terms of emic 
correctness, this paper claimed that it followed Klein 
& Myers’s (1999) principles, but there was no 
evidence of this and little attempt was made to check 
the validity of the results with the participants. In terms 
of etic correctness, this paper used theory and the 
process of dissemination may have involved other 
researchers. 
The critical paper adhered strongly to i-correctness, 
explicitly following a set of validity guidelines in 
applying critical theory concepts, but it was weak in 
terms of e-correctness—there was little attempt to 
allow the participants to validate the results or to bring 
about actual change. The action research paper was 
strong in terms of both i-correctness and e-correctness, 
demonstrating both that the intervention was 
successful and that it led to interesting theory. The 
design science paper followed a rigorous methodology 
and used “micro-evaluations” through the design 
process. In the end, however, only a prototype was 
developed, not a fully working system.  
We believe that Table 8 demonstrates that our 
framework can be used successfully to evaluate 
research that has already been carried out; future 
research could involve a more extensive evaluation of 
published papers. The framework can also be used to 
develop and inform research that is still in progress. 
6 Conclusion 
We would first like to make clear what we are not 
suggesting in this research. First, we are not 
prescribing or privileging any particular research 
methods; indeed, our whole argument is based on the 
idea that all approaches may well be able to contribute 
to information systems research, whether in terms of 
knowledge, understanding, or practical developments 
(Galliers & Stein, 2018b). This is true both for a single 
research method as well as for a combination of 
methods within a multimethodology (Mingers, 2001a, 
2011; Venkatesh et al., 2013), which is our preferred 
option. Second, we are not suggesting direct changes 
to specific research methods, whether they be the 
statistical analysis of surveys or the coding of 
ethnographic data, but we are suggesting that research 
methods should be carried out with more concern for 
and consideration of their validity. 
The implications of our analysis of truth and 
correctness are as follows. Research is often carried 
out and published with little explicit regard for its 
validity (Boudreau et al., 2001; Gonzalez & Sol, 2012; 
Jones, 2004; King & He, 2005; MacKenzie et al., 2011; 
Straub, 1989; Wieringa & Moralı, 2012). For research 
to make a genuine contribution, either to knowledge or 
to practice, and to be published in journals or lead to 
organizational change, every effort must be made to 
demonstrate that the results are valid, that is believed 
to be true or correct.  
As we have demonstrated, there are two fundamental 
and distinct characteristics—internal correctness and 
external correctness, also known as verification and 
validation, or formative and summative. The first is 
normative and concerns the way that research should 
be carried out; the second is descriptive and concerns 
the relationship of the research findings to the external 
context. We have demonstrated both of these criteria 
in the framework and across a wide range of research 
approaches. We agree with Lee and Hubona (2009) 
that much less attention is paid to e-correctness than i-
correctness; yet, arguably, the former is more 
important. 
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It is tempting also to align these two types of 
correctness with rigor and relevance. Certainly i-
correctness concerns the rigor of the research and e-
correctness is related to the relevance of the research, 
at a minimum. Although some very abstract research 
may not initially seem to have much direct relevance, 
one only needs to think of the laser or prime number 
theory to see how such research may later become 
highly relevant. In some ways, our work could be seen 
as similar to that of Rosemann and Vessey (2008), who 
are concerned with improving the relevance of IS 
research. They produced applicability checklists to 
assess the practical relevance of research through focus 
groups and nominal group techniques. Our framework 
can be used similarly to improve the rigor of research; 
but, clearly, the e-correctness component already 
includes relevance in methods such as design science 
or action research that specifically aim for change. 
Nevertheless, one could also specifically include 
relevance as a criterion in other forms of research if 
desired. 
We believe that it is important that we have produced 
a framework that encompasses a wide range of 
methods. Too often, different research methods are 
seen to be in competition or even in conflict with each 
other. This framework demonstrates that all research 
methods can be seen as sharing some very basic 
characteristics and that all are ultimately part of the 
same human drive to better understand and improve 
the world. By focusing explicitly on both internal and 
external correctness, we hope that the results of 
research will become more informative and effective.  
In a recent debate hosted by the Communications of the 
Association for Information Systems, McBride (2018) 
raised the age-old question (Galliers & Stein, 2018a) 
of whether IS should be seen as a science, 
characterizing science purely in terms of positivistic 
statistical analysis. McBride actually suggested that it 
should not, that it should rather be seen as more akin 
to a complex, multilevel humanities discipline such as 
dance. From the point of view of this paper, we rather 
agree with his characterization of IS as multifaceted 
but disagree with McBride’s characterization of 
science as purely positivist. Instead, we would adopt a 
critical realist view that science is a much broader and 
more pluralistic search for knowledge in many 
heterogeneous domains. Each domain (including those 
to come in the future) has its own objects of knowledge 
that require its own research methods to access. Our 
framework offers a deep-level basis or foundation for 
these varied research approaches and seeks to maintain 
their integrity as “inquiring systems” (Churchman, 
1971) through focusing on i- and e-correctness. 
Research needs to develop in a way that explicitly 
considers both these aspects of correctness at all 
stages—the design of the research, its 
operationalization, and its description and 
dissemination. We hope that our framework can 
provide guidance for researchers to consider as they 
design their research, and for referees and editors to 
look for when evaluating submissions or grant 
applications.  
In terms of limitations and further research, we note 
the following: The framework could be developed to 
include further research approaches that we have not 
considered, for example theoretical computer science, 
neuroIS, feminist research, or multimethodology. It 
could also be developed internally to provide greater 
discrimination within approaches, especially in the 
interpretive area, where it may be found useful to have 
different criteria for, say, hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, textual analysis, and semiotics. The 
advantage of a framework such as ours is that it makes 
everything explicit (Klein & Myers, 1999) and can 
thus act as a trigger for debate. It may well be that 
proponents of particular methods may disagree with 
our validity criteria, but at least we provide a target at 
which to aim. 
For a major research question, it may be that all the 
validity criteria cannot be answered within a single 
study. There may need to be sequential studies— 
perhaps some formative studies initially, followed by 
summative studies later on. Perhaps, different methods 
will need to be applied to different aspects of the 
situation, thus invoking different validity questions. 
Such considerations clearly lead to the possibility of 
mixed methods work; they also touch on the question 
of generalizability. In this paper, we distinguished the 
e-correctness (or validity) of a particular study based 
on the extent to which it can be generalized to other 
contexts. However, validity and generalizability are 
clearly related and the generalization question also 
raises its own issues of validity that we have not 
addressed here.
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Appendix A: Theories of Truth 
1   Robust or Substantialist Theories of Truth  
1.1   Correspondence Theory 
The essence of correspondence theory is what is called “alethic8 realism”—that is, that truth depends on the way the 
world actually is, so truth has a nature and its nature is objective; it depends on the world itself, not what we believe 
about it. Correspondence theories involve specifying what may be true (“truth bearer”), the “reality” to which it 
corresponds (“truth maker”), and the nature of the correspondence relation. There have been a variety of answers to 
these questions as shown in Table A1. 
Table A1. Examples of Correspondence Theories 
Theory Truth bearer Relation Truth maker 
Russell (1906) Beliefs A structural isomorphism between 
the belief and the facts 
Facts: a complex 
unity of parts and 
relations 
Austin (1950) Propositions or 
sentences 
Correlation, sometimes 
conventional, rather than structural 
isomorphism 
Things, features, 
facts, states of affairs 
Field (1974) Words or sentences A causal relationship, or state of 
affair, leads us to make particular 
statements 
The world 
Alston (2001) Propositions: the 
content of the act of 
stating or believing  
Objective, mind-independent, 
nonepistemic (i.e., not based on 
evidence) 
Facts about how the 
world is 
These different versions of correspondence theory all share the core concept that there is something, namely the mind-
independent world, that makes our beliefs or propositions true whether or not we can discover or justify that truth. 
There are many objections to correspondence theory. In brief: 
• The consistency problem: that beliefs or statements are different from states of affairs or facts in the world and 
that the two cannot logically be compared. Beliefs can only be compared to other beliefs. 
• The realism problem:  that we do not have epistemological access to an independent external reality; we always 
experience it through our perceptions, cognitions and language, and so can never discover if our beliefs are true. 
• The justification problem: that the truth of a proposition is independent of our justification for it, so all our beliefs 
could be false. 
• The scope problem: that propositions could be of so many different kinds (scientific, mathematical, fictional, moral 
etc.); thus, there can be no one property or causal relation than makes them all true 
These arguments have led to the main, substantive, alternatives to correspondence. 
1.2   Coherence Theory 
Coherence theories differ in terms of both the truth relation and the form of truth maker. In general, coherence theories 
specify that the relationship is one of internal consistency and coherence with some set of other consistent propositions 
or beliefs, rather than any reference to an external world. Theoretical holism (Quine & Ullian, 1978) requires that a 
belief is logically consistent with some system of beliefs but does not specify precisely what that set might be. Joachim 
(1906) argued that that the set of beliefs must form a comprehensive and significant system of beliefs, and Blanshard 
(1941) went further saying that such a system should be comprehensive in including all known facts, and where each 
judgment should entail and be entailed by every other. More recently, Alcoff (2001) has suggested that the system 
should not consist just of beliefs but also of social practices, traditions and life events, and, moreover, that there can 
 
8 From the Greek alethia, meaning truth 
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be different sets of beliefs, accounting for different experiences of the world, which may not necessarily be 
contradictory. Coherence theory has been applied in specific domains such as mathematics. 
1.3   Pragmatist and Consensus Theories 
These theories judge truth not in terms of correspondence to reality, but in terms of the degree of evidence, agreement 
or usefulness. For this reason, they are called epistemic theories. They can be traced to the American pragmatist 
philosophers. For instance, truth for Peirce (1878) was “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all 
who investigate, is what we mean by the truth.” (p. 299) For James (1981), what is important is what practical effect 
truth would have: “true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those 
that we cannot.” (p. 96) Dewey (1938) introduced the idea of “warranted assertibility”: “If inquiry begins in doubt, it 
terminates in the institution of conditions that remove the need for doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated 
by the words belief and knowledge. For reasons that I shall state later I prefer the words ‘warranted assertibility.’” (p. 
7) Thus, from this perspective, there is not an absolute truth, certainly not in correspondence with an external reality. 
Rather, truth (or perhaps knowledge) is always provisional and fallible, based on the best evidence and information 
that we have; it moves toward but may never reach, the ideal of certainty.  
In more recent times, Putnam (1981) was close to this view in arguing that truth was what we would agree on under 
ideal epistemic conditions, “ideal warranted assertibility” which would depend on the particular entities being studied 
and was an ideal in the sense that it could be approached but never realized in practice (he later moved away from this 
approach). Wright (2009) has proposed the alternative notion of “superassertibility.” For Peirce and Putman, getting 
closer to the truth involves gaining more and more precise information under increasingly ideal conditions. Wright 
suggests instead that, given some reasonable and practical evidence or information in favor of an idea, we should ask, 
would it remain warranted no matter how the information was improved or enlarged in the future: “A statement is 
superassertible, then, if and only if it is or can be warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close 
scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to, or other forms of improvement of, our information” 
(Wright, 2001, p. 771). It has been suggested that this notion is applicable to domains such as ethics as well. 
Habermas, too, essentially had a pragmatist/consensus theory of truth but later changed in a significant way. Originally, 
with his theory of knowledge constitutive interests (Habermas, 1978), he identified three forms of science—
empirical/analytic, hermeneutic (normative) and emancipatory—but all three were underpinned by a discursive theory 
of truth. Like Putnam, he discussed the circumstances under which ideal agreement could be reached and called the 
“ideal speech situation” the point at which truth would be generated by “the unforced force of the better argument” 
(Habermas, 1974, p. 240; 2003, p. 37). So, truth emerges through infinite, unfettered debate. 
However, Habermas (2003) now recognizes a substantive difference between the empirical domain and the normative 
domain. Whereas normative or moral issues can only ever be established through debate and discourse, he now believes 
that propositional statements about the material world can be proved wrong by events even if they were the result of 
ideal debate. He states: “I have given up an epistemic conception of truth and have sought to distinguish more clearly 
between the truth of a proposition and its rational assertibility (even under approximately ideal conditions)” (p. 8).  
Habermas now accepts the basic realist view that there is a world independent of human beings, that we all experience 
the same world, and that this places constraints upon us. However, he still maintains that our access to this world is 
inevitably conditioned or filtered through our concepts and language: “These objections have prompted me to revise 
the discursive conception of rational acceptability by relating it to a pragmatically conceived, nonepistemic concept of 
truth, but without thereby assimilating ‘truth’ to ‘ideal assertibility’” (Habermas, 2003, p. 38). 
2   Skeptical and Deflationist Theories 
2.1   Deflationist Theories 
A number of theories call into question the fundamental premise of robust theories: namely, that truth does, in fact, 
have a substantial nature that needs to be explained. Ramsey (1927) holds that the concept of truth is essentially 
redundant. In saying “it is true that snow is white” we are actually adding nothing to the statement that “snow is white.” 
The latter assumes or presumes the idea of truth and there nothing else to be said.  
Strawson (1950) maintains that truth is essentially performative; by saying “it is true that snow is white,” we are really 
just recommending or agreeing to the claim, so the truth predicate is not a property but an endorsement.  
According to Quine (1992), truth is disquotational: “‘Snow is white is true’ if and only if snow is white. To ascribe 
truth to the sentence is to ascribe whiteness to snow; such is the correspondence in this example. Ascription of truth 
just cancels the quotation marks. Truth is disquotation” (p. 78). 
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Horwich (1991) argues for what he calls a minimalist theory of truth. This is not a theory of what truth is, but proposes 
simply that truth is a logical system that has as its axiom every single instance of the general propositional form “The 
proposition that p is true if p.” An infinite number of such statements is possible; for example, “the proposition that 
snow is white is true if and only if snow is white.” 
As can be seen, each of these theories denies in different ways that there should be a substantive explanation of the 
concept of truth. In general, this is not a conclusion that many philosophers accept, and there are particular criticisms 
of each of the individual approaches—see Lynch (2001) section 6 for details. 
2.2   Skeptical Views 
There are also philosophies that deny substantialist forms of truth outlined above in different ways without using 
deflationary arguments.  
As a postmodernist, Foucault is well known for developing the idea that truth is intimately connected to power, such 
that ideas that are powerful are thereby true. He uses the term “power/knowledge” (Foucault, 1980) to emphasize that 
the two concepts are inseparable. For Foucault, truth is a system of procedures for producing and ordering knowledge 
based on systems of power like the scientific community, governments, and the media. There are no objectively true 
statements but merely statements that pass for true or are accepted as true within a community at a certain time (Allen, 
1993, ch. 8).  
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true 
and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) 
No doubt there is something to this view in the sense that what is taken as true does indeed change across time and 
different cultures, and what is taken as true is produced through powerful institutions. According to Marx (1965): “The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” But, would we wish to accept the relativism implied by 
that view? That the sun goes around the earth is as true as the earth goes around the sun, or that unpleasant events are 
caused by devils or witches? Furthermore, such skepticism would also seem to undermine Foucault’s own work, for 
according to this view, a critique can only be true if it is produced by a system of power; thus, either it is within the 
system, in which case it is not real critique, or it is outside the system, in which case it is not true. 
There is also the solipsistic position, stemming mainly from Descartes (2013), who famously stated that the only thing 
we can be certain about is our own individual mind. This may be epistemological—i.e., we can only know about our 
own mind—or it may be ontological, i.e., the world and other minds do not exist. Such extreme skepticism would 
indeed preclude any form of truth, except that generated by our own internal certainty, and this position is not actually 
held by any philosophers. Such a viewpoint is also incoherent (Thornton, 2017). In order to even express such a 
position, it is necessary for there to be some sign-system or language, but, as Wittgenstein (1958) demonstrates with 
his “private language” arguments, language is irreducibly social. Language consists of many language games that are 
public not private, and even to question, argue, or doubt something is to enter into a language game and thus assume 
something external to the individual mind. 
3   Pluralist Theories of Truth 
3.1   Weak Pluralism 
Edwards (2011; 2013) likens truth to the notion of winning a game. We have a general idea of what winning is, but 
each game is different. To win at chess you need to checkmate, while to win at tennis you need to win the majority of 
available sets. Although there is some unity of what it means to win or to be a winner that is independent of the 
particular game involved, determining the winner is different in each game.  
In terms of truth, the unity of truth can be captured by a collection of “platitudes,” such as “truth is the goal of inquiry” 
or “truth is a property that is distinct from justification,” which describe the nature of truth in general. To see how 
propositions (Edwards uses propositions as truth bearers) can come to have this truth property, we need to look at 
specific domains to see what is acceptable to generate truth in that domain. This evaluation has two aspects: First, we 
must study the subject-matter of the domain to see what type it is—for example, is it genuinely representational or 
simply discursive or logical. Second, we need to see what kind of property can establish truth in that domain—for 
example, correspondence between propositions and nonlinguistic entities, coherence between linguistic entities, or a 
procedure or proof.  
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We can then form conditionals such as: 
• In arithmetical discourse, if p coheres with basic axioms then p is true. 
Or, alternatively: 
• In arithmetical discourse, p is true if p coheres with basic axioms. 
Thus, a proposition that is found to be true according to the criteria of its domain is also true generally. 
This approach is only a framework and there would be many details to work out: 
• Can we determine an exhaustive list of platitudes to define truth in general? 
• How do we decide the nature and scope of the various domains? 
• Can we determine the content and criteria of a domain adequately and is there an agreed criterion for truth in each 
domain? 
• Can we show that the individual truth criteria do, in fact, imply truth platitudes? 
There are other versions of this approach that we will not discuss, such as manifestation functionalism (Lynch, 2009) 
and the disjunctivist view (Pedersen & Wright, 2013b). 
3.2   Correspondence Pluralism 
In this section, we discuss two approaches—those of Horgan and Fumerton, respectively. 
Horgan (Barnard & Horgan, 2013; 2001) terms his approach “semantically correct assertibility” (note the use of 
“correct,” which links to the next section). Horgan is a realist who accepts that there is a mind-independent and 
language-independent world, although the world contains humans and their thoughts and activities, which are clearly 
human-dependent. One of the things we do is make statements or assertions about the way the world is, and these 
statements may be right or wrong depending on how the world is, which is what we mean by truth. So, for Horgan, 
truth is always correspondence. 
However, Horgan recognizes that in a discourse, there are two different aspects to the way we describe or assert things 
about the world: (1) Relevant semantics standards that govern the types of things discussed (terms) and their predicates 
(properties and relations)—called the “positing apparatus.” (2) The actual world, which may or may not be as it is 
described. 
In a small number of domains, it is possible that the terms and their predicates may directly correspond to elements of 
the real world. In such cases, semantic standards are maximally strict and involve direct correspondence. However, in 
most discourses, such a direct relationship is not possible. The semantic apparatus is relatable to the world and the 
world may or may not conform to it; thus, truth is possible but in an indirect way. At the extreme, there may be a 
minimal dependence on the world and truth would be defined almost entirely semantically. An example of this can be 
seen in mathematics, where there is only the semantic correctness with respect to mathematical axioms. 
Most everyday talk and most scientific talk lies between these extremes with assertions about the world being 
semantically mediated. Consider a statement like: “In 2018 Amazon was the world’s biggest Internet company with 
revenues of $253.9b,” which is correct according to Wikipedia.9 Most of the terms in this statement, such as company, 
revenue, even Amazon, are complex abstractions that cannot be observed directly in the world in the way that trees or 
tables can be. Similarly, a statement like “two is the only prime number” is true, even though, ontologically, the world 
may not contain evenness or primeness as such.  
The advantage of Horgan’s approach is that, under traditional correspondence theory, it was expected that there were 
specific truth makers holding a one-to-one correspondence with the elements of truth bearers. Under this view, such a 
correspondence is no longer necessary: “Claims are true because they really do correspond to the world, even if, (as is 
typically the case) their positing apparatus does not map directly onto objects, properties and relations that belong to 
the correct ontology” (Barnard & Horgan, 2013, p. 8). 
With this approach, we can accept that much of what is said is indeed true (although discovering which statements are 
true is different from defining the nature of truth), and that much everyday knowledge is also true. This obviously 
depends on the validity of the operative semantic standards, but they will likely be aligned with what may be 
epistemically warranted (i.e., the pragmatic approach to truth), even though the two must not be seen as identical. 
 
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_Internet_companies 
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Fumerton (2013) also believes that all forms of truth are essentially a correspondence between two elements, but he 
developed three ideas of particular interest. First, Fumerton maintains that correspondence does not necessarily occur 
between a belief or proposition and facts about the external world. Correspondence could occur between beliefs or 
ideas and other sets of ideas as, arguably, Berkeley (1995) held, and would thus be a form of coherence correspondence. 
Or, there could be a correspondence between beliefs or ideas and perceptions of the world as Hume (1967) held, thus 
making the facts (truth makers) not mind-independent. Or, there could be a correspondence between pragmatic 
utterances and the intentions and sincerity of the speaker (Habermas, 1984).10 
Second, that correspondence truth is not all or nothing, right or wrong. There can be different degrees of truth in the 
relationships between our beliefs and the world, in the same way that pictures or models may represent with different 
levels of detail or faithfulness. In any case, our concepts, and even our most precise measurements, always have a 
degree of vagueness or imprecision about them so that they cannot correspond with the world perfectly. Thus, the 
degree of truth will depend on the form of representation (and the purpose for which it occurs). Equally, many 
properties, such as “tall,” are intrinsically relative, not absolute. Thus, Tom may be tall in general but not tall relative 
to the class of basketball players—these two assertions do not contradict each other, they are both true. 
Third, that there can be different representations of the same reality without these being necessarily incompatible, i.e., 
each could be true. This could occur because we investigate different aspects of the same world, e.g., through a 
microscope or through an X-ray, or with a painting or a photo; or, it could be because we organize our observations 
differently, perhaps because of different theoretical lenses. What correspondence theory cannot accept is that there are 
two incompatible pictures that both claim to be true: “that which cannot be stated without contradiction cannot be.” 
  
 
10 Our suggestion, not Fumerton’s 
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Appendix B: Potential Objections to our Approach 
First, our overall assumption is that despite the existence of many different research approaches stemming from 
different traditions and paradigms (although we do not accept the view that paradigms are incommensurable), it is 
nevertheless possible to argue that there are some fundamental concepts, such as truth, correctness, and validity, that 
underlie them all. If scholars are conducting research, then they presumably wish to produce good answers to their 
research questions, whatever they may be. Our argument is that the answers are likely to be better if attention is paid 
to qualities such as correctness or validity. Some may disagree with this and argue either that research methods are so 
different that they have nothing in common, or that concepts such as truth and validity are not important. This is, of 
course, their right and one of the aims of our paper is to generate just such a debate. 
Second, a related aspect of our position is that we accept some form of pluralism, which encourages us to value a wide 
range of research methods. Watson (1990) suggests that there are four fundamental forms of philosophical pluralism. 
• Perspectival pluralism: This suggests that a plurality of views comes about because each of us, as individuals, 
sees and experiences the world differently or, rather, experiences a different world because of our genetics, 
biology, experiences, and culture. As Watson explains, “We do not experience the same world, but different 
worlds. Each of us has his own world, his own reality, and there are as many realities as there are perceivers” (p. 
358). This form of pluralism underlies the more extreme versions of interpretivism, subjectivism, and 
constructivism. 
• Pluralism of hypotheses: This suggests that there is, indeed, one common reality that we all share; however, at 
any particular time, there are many different and often competing theories and views of that reality. We never 
ultimately reach or experience that reality, but we may hope to move toward it, because false hypotheses clash 
with that reality. This form of pluralism can be seen in Peirce (1958), for whom truth is the ultimate endpoint of 
inquiry, and Popper (1969). Knowledge is always provisional and fallible. 
• Methodological pluralism: This also suggests that there is one reality, but we cannot know it. Different views 
are not so much alternatives that compete with each other, as partial and potentially complementary views of the 
one reality: “The plurality of philosophies does not imply, however, that at most one can be true, but rather that 
all share in the truth that none possesses wholly” (Watson, 1990, p. 354). This suggests that there is no ultimate 
incompatibility between competing views; they are each partial views of the same whole. The implication is that 
different methods or methodologies can access these different views of the world and are thus complementary to 
each other rather than being in competition, which would suggest a combination of different methods. This is the 
form of pluralism adopted in this paper. 
• Archic pluralism: This suggests that different perspectives or philosophies come about from fundamentally 
different sets of principles or starting points.  
In these terms, our pluralism is clearly that of methodological pluralism—we argue that different research methods 
give us insights into different but complementary aspects of the world, much like an X-ray and a microscope do. Some 
reveal the hard, material aspects of the world (e.g., an X-ray and a microscope give different views of physical reality); 
some the social and cultural aspects (e.g., social network analysis or participant observation); and some the personal 
and psychological aspects (e.g., interviews or cognitive mapping) (Mingers, 2001a). 
Third, it could be argued that validity and rigor comprise only one aspect of high-quality research and that 
concentrating on these aspects alone could come at the expense of, for example, practical relevance or novelty and 
innovation. We certainly accept this—the best research is rigorous, innovative, and addresses significant issues 
(Mingers, 2014; Syed, Mingers, & Murray, 2009)—thus, we do not wish to encourage the view that simply ticking the 
validity box is, by itself, sufficient. But we do argue that, given a significant issue and an innovative idea, the more 
rigorously the research is carried out, the better the result will be. For this reason, we hope our paper contributes to 
rigor in research. 
Fourth, we argue that it is possible to produce a framework that can actually include a range of heterogeneous 
approaches. Certainly, in the past many would have argued that the incommensurability thesis made this idea 
incoherent. Against this view, we argue that not only was the incommensurability thesis flawed in the first place (and 
not really what Kuhn meant anyway (Hassan & Mingers, 2018), but the concern has generally died away to the extent 
that mixed-method (and thereby cross-paradigm) work is almost becoming the norm within IS (Mingers, 2001a, 
2004a), as well as in the wider domain of social science (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 
2003). 
Fifth, a related but separate concern is that a framework such as ours may actually be used to suppress heterogeneity 
and innovation (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015). A set of common standards could potentially be applied by journals to 
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limit both the range and applications of research methods. This is certainly not the intention of our framework. We 
have tried to be wide-ranging in the methods that we have included; however, it would have been impossible to include 
everything because methods are always changing and developing. For more discussion of the inclusions and 
exclusions, see Section 4 above regarding the application of the framework. With regard to disciplinary pressures, we 
view our framework as having the potential to help with these concerns. First, by including as many approaches as 
possible within the one framework, based as it is on underlying foundational concepts such as truth and correctness, 
we are, in a sense, making them all equal. It should no longer be possible to privilege positivism over the other 
approaches on the grounds of its supposedly greater rigor. Second, putting all approaches in one framework should 
actually encourage the use of multiple methods, since the framework recognizes that all approaches have validity 
criteria of their own even though they may be different, thus endowing the pluralist approach with more confidence 
and credence. We see the framework as an enabler rather than a straitjacket, and as a contribution rather than an 
endpoint. We hope that it stimulates discussion and debate, and we hope that experts in different approaches further 
develop the framework to make it more effective. 
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